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WHEN FLESH 
BECOMES 
ORNAMENT
CHALAY CHALERMKRAIVUTH
AFONG MOY, the first Chinese woman to “immigrate”  
to the United States, was imported for exhibition  
in 1834 by brothers Nathaniel and Frederick Carne.  
A poster dating from 1842 proclaims, in typography 
by turns gaudy and sensibly serif,
“THE CHINESE LADY, AFONG MOY, Lately 
exhibited in Mobile, Providence, Boston, Salem, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Richmond, 
Norfolk, Charleston, New York and New Haven, 
will have the honor of appearing before the 
Company in a splendid CHINESE SALOON, fit-
ted up with rich Canton Satin Damask Chinese 
Paintings, Lanterns and Curiosities.”
An illustration depicts her smothered in an elabo-
rate silken robe, and smothered once more in the 
dizzyingly intricate saloon. She appears to be one 
with the chinoiserie and the Canton Satin Damask 
Chinese Paintings behind her. Of her own flesh we 
see only her face, her hands, and her “ASTONISHINGLY 
LITTE FEET.”1
The last of Moy’s traces dates from 1850; what hap-
pened to her afterwards, if anything, is unknown.  
But her life’s echo is heard in all the decorative 
Asian beauties, more ornament than person, who 
have been paraded about to the American public 
since. Denied humanity through aestheticization,  
the yellow woman is nevertheless no object of art—
china is, after all, irremediably associated with 
kitsch. She lives, instead, as ornament.
There is a ready vocabulary to describe the forces 
at work here: objectification, on the one hand (the 
OED’s chipper, concise definition: “the action of 
degrading someone to the status of a mere object” 
2); Orientalism, on the other (“the representation 
of Asia … in a stereotyped way … [that embodies] 
a colonialist attitude”3). It is well-established in 
feminist thought that women have been considered 
less than human, well-established in black feminist 
thought that the manner of this dehumanization is 
splintered along racial lines (think, by comparison, 
of the Hottentot Venus and her fetishized flesh). 
But stating this truth does not tell us its meaning or 
its consequences. It is one thing to identify oppres-
sive fictions, but quite another to understand, let 
alone explain, the hybrid, fantastical beings—Asiatic 
cyborgs, porcelain dolls, geisha girls—that emerge 
from these strange and violent conflations. 
What Anne Cheng looks to offer in her new mono-
graph Ornamentalism is a heretofore-missing theory 
of Asiatic femininity. She doesn’t look to critique  
the confluence of racism and sexism that produces 
the not-quite-human, not-quite-thing that is the “yel-
low woman” (a term she revives to grapple with its 
legacy) so much as to examine what kind of being 
gets produced.
Where black feminist thinkers like Hortense Spillers 
have focused on flesh as the site of the black wom-
an’s denigration and racialization, Cheng’s theory 
of the yellow woman revolves around flesh’s oppo-
site: artifice, ornament, style. “The yellow woman … 
makes visible [an] unspeakable aspect of injury: its 
unnerving capacity to be seen as a quality of beauty 
and to incite appreciation. There are few figures who 
exemplify the beauty of abjectness more than the 
yellow woman,” she writes. Cheng argues that style 
has not been supplemental to the being of the yellow 
woman, but constitutive of it. And she suggests that 
this speaks to a broader truth: that style and artifice 
are always constitutive of being, and that in looking 
for a unified essence, an organic body, or a natural 
personhood, we look for the impossible.
Ornamentalism poses a challenge to the kind 
of personhood that canonical political philoso-
phers—Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and William 
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Cheng’s opening critique of feminist theory—that 
it occupies itself too much with the flesh—comes 
full circle here: flesh is ornament, and requires the 
ornamental practices of synthesis and assemblage 
in order to put itself back together again. To put this 
in more familiar terms: one returns to the body with 
(self-)care. At its best, Ornamentalism offers an alter-
native vision of agency as not resistance but resil-
ience, of forms of living produced under impossible 
conditions—providing, too, a much-needed concreti-
zation of post-humanism’s rhetorical gestures.
But if flesh may find itself through ornamental 
practices, how might ornament find itself? Cheng 
dismisses, after all, nostalgia for the flesh, so 
there is nothing for the yellow woman to return to, 
no enfleshment to crave. Of course, her work has 
partly been to deconstruct the distinction between 
flesh and ornament, but the fluidity between the 
two seems to be one-way. Here Cheng’s effer-
vescent work registers the limitations of its own 
framework: the figure around whom ornamentalist 
ontology is built does not stand to recover through it. 
Furthermore, because the book is in no sense about 
real Asian women, it does not speak to our lives, 
spectral or otherwise, an effect exacerbated by the 
book’s near-exclusive concern with ravaged beauty 
and East Asian aesthetics—itself powerful and hege-
monic in the age of East Asian economic and geopo-
litical dominance. It may be telling that the subject 
of the book’s most redemptive treatment of a yellow 
woman, Shosho, is an exceedingly beautiful celebrity. 
What may we who carry flesh do with this work? For 
us, “corporeal dematerialization” cannot be literal, 
so for what is it a metaphor? And: if Asiatic feminin-
ity is style, when do Asian women—and which Asian 
women—get to wear it?
It was not Cheng’s intent to address these ques-
tions: as she explicates in the preface, “This … is not 
a manual that teaches Asian and Asian American 
women how to act. But by tracing the complex 
dynamics between subjecthood and objecthood, we 
might begin to shake loose some of our most funda-
mental assumptions about what kind of person, what 
kind of injury, or indeed, what kind of life can count.” 
Her work, which teaches us how to think about shad-
owy, complex, uncomfortable figures, is complemen-
tary to activism, not activism itself. 
But the theory of Asiatic femininity she has for-
warded so boldly is incomplete without an audience 
that isn’t just scholarly, without an address to a pub-
lic community. Such is the flaw of post-humanism in 
practice: as crucial as it is and has been to trouble 
traditional notions of the human, post-humanist 
work can fail to make a distinction between “human” 
as academic byword for Lockeian-liberal-humanism 
and “human” as a common word for real people. To 
call anti- or post-humanism literally anti-human 
is, in an important sense, to talk past its histori-
cal formation; it is, in another sense, to pinpoint a 
deadly flaw in its evolution, during which the original 
referent of “human” has been partially obscured in 
a scholarly haze. Post-humanist works point to the 
necessity of deep care for all forms of life, intercon-
nected as they are, and for marginalized forms more 
than others. If they lose sight of the marginalized 
communities to which they are theoretically and eth-
ically indebted, then the point is lost.
Cheng has historicized and politicized post-human-
ism, but to be practicable, post-humanism must 
make good on its promises to the humans in our 
midst.
Blackstone—conceived of: a personhood charac-
terized by freedom, autonomy, agency, and natural 
internal coherence. She shares this anti-humanist 
critique with Marxist, feminist, and critical race 
theorists, who have been arguing since the 20th 
century that humans are much less free than pow-
erful people—who have tended to be propertied 
white men—have claimed they are. Her innovation 
is that she does not seek redemption through a 
return to agency, bodies, or personhood. Instead 
she embraces surface, excess, and non-humanity, 
insisting, in fact, on their centrality, and enjoining 
her fellow feminist and race scholars to overcome 
nostalgia for the flesh.
Each of Cheng’s chapters takes up a new cluster of 
case studies, and a new intersection of disciplines, 
in order to probe at the interface of personhood 
and objecthood. The book’s first half is devoted to 
humans who are produced through style. The first 
chapter deconstructs legal personhood through the 
“Case of the Twenty-Two Lewd Chinese Women,” in 
which twenty-two recently-arrived immigrants were 
conceptualized and judged through their clothing—
or, more precisely, through white American men’s 
prurient imaginings about their clothing. The second 
chapter takes up, somewhat more disjointedly, Anne 
May Wong’s role in Piccadilly (1929) as Shosho, an 
objectified woman who claims her own objecthood 
in order to achieve aesthetic centrality.
Ornamentalism’s second half shifts into more exper-
imental territory, to thrilling results when Cheng is 
most successful, and puzzling tracts when she falls 
short. Where the first half investigates humans pro-
duced through style, the second concerns objects 
that straddle and cross the border between objects 
and humans by invoking racial otherness. The third 
chapter is a stunning study of Through the Looking 
Glass, the Met’s exhibit of “Eastern” aesthetics and 
Western appropriations; the fourth is a foray into 
food and the border between consumer and con-
sumed; and the fifth, a rich consideration of block-
buster representations of white-coded, feminine 
robots who arrogate themselves to, and are haunted 
by, Asiatic femininity.
Cheng describes her own method best in her 
description of Anna May Wong’s performance: “she 
commands all things around her, centrifugally pulls 
objects, lights, and glances to her magnetic center” 
(81). At her critical disposal is an improbably vast 
array of disciplines: celebrity studies, aesthetic 
philosophy, critical legal theory, photography theory, 
science and technology studies—just to name a few, 
beyond the dominant frameworks of feminist and 
critical race theory. Her arguments are so wide-rang-
ing in their intellectual ancestry as to be irreducible 
to their parts. 
And it is important that Cheng’s method is interdis-
ciplinary, because one of the book’s premises is that 
part of what it means to be a yellow woman is that 
one is an aesthetic artifact—which is to say that, for 
Cheng, the study of being and the study of aesthet-
ics are much the same. Ornamentalism, like the 
people and objects that populate it, is a profoundly 
synthetic work that finds being through assemblage. 
It is an act of interdisciplinary daring that is often 
dazzling, bearing the occasional cost of being far-
fetched. And it is a redemptive reading of raced and 
gendered objecthood, at the occasional risk of run-
ning counter to the political goal of censuring objec-
tification. Cheng is keen to investigate moments of 
yellowface and appropriation, and her theorizing is 
so rich and achieved as to be worth the risks atten-
dant to readings that are not specifically condemna-
tory. At the same time, the specter she wards off in 
such moments—the specter of politics—haunts the 
book. We therefore hear an almost anxious refrain, 
in which Cheng defends her choice of redemption 
over skepticism:
“If we dismiss this association between Asiatic 
femininity and Chinese ceramic as yet another 
Orientalist cliché, we miss a much more intricate 
and intriguing proposition: the affinity between 
racialization, imagined personhood, and syn-
thetic invention.”
Perhaps there is no contradiction here. Perhaps 
delineating something that others would will away is 
complementary, not dialectical, to their efforts. After 
all, Ornamentalism offers itself as a solution to the 
political anemia of other schools of object-oriented 
ontology, known broadly and popularly as post-hu-
manism. Post-humanism is a broad term indeed, 
encapsulating a range of critical impulses that are 
loosely united in their decentering of humanity. 
Sometimes these impulses are technological (the 
robots-are-coming-to-get-us school), sometimes envi-
ronmental (the climate-change-is-coming-to-get-us 
school); either way, they frame post-humanism as a 
distinct moment in history when the human race’s 
dominance is on the brink of expiration. Which is 
political enough, but this trendy new post-human-
ism—often practiced by white scholars—conveniently 
forgets the roots of post-humanism in feminist and 
critical race theory, which has long since worked to 
question liberal humanist ideology by bringing to 
light histories of dehumanization. Ornamentalism 
unites the turn towards non-human things with the 
older tradition of post-humanism by pointing to ways 
in which humans are constructed through things, 
and things comes to life—or don’t—through “the 
conduit of racial meaning.” It therefore historicizes 
future-oriented, ahistorical post-humanism, and rec-
onciles it with its raced and gendered past.
But one problem with post-humanism’s politics per-
sists: its treatment of agency. A rejection of liberal 
humanism is a rejection, in part, of the traditional 
conception of agency. But to abandon traditional 
agency without offering an alternative is to abandon 
political action. Take Marxist anti-humanism, which, 
at its extreme, totally denied the existence of human 
agency, displacing the motion of history onto struc-
tural forces. The malaise of determinism makes 
political action look naïve.
Racial post-humanism suggests that agency is not 
desirable, because it occurs only in a world whose 
existence we do not want to prolong, a world that 
has worked to eliminate other worlds and subjugate 
the life found therein: native communities, raced 
populations, non-human species. It looks, instead, at 
life that has appeared non-agential—in the form of 
flesh, spirit, animal, plant, or cyborg—and suggests 
that we cultivate that life, care for it, permit its 
endurance, if not its flourishing. This is a beauti-
ful thought, a world-loving thought. But what is the 
actual practice of post-humanism?
Cheng’s image of ornamentalism as practice arrives 
in the monograph’s epilogue, in which she discusses 
the character of Sethe in Toni Morrison’s Beloved. 
Sethe’s lacerated back is on the one hand “dead,” on 
the other a “chokecherry.” In her, Cheng finds “an 
alternative form of ontology, one entwined with dirt, 
soil, and death.” She ends on a singingly eloquent 
note of redemption as found through ornament:
“The flesh that passes through objecthood needs 
‘ornament’ as a way back to itself. Even Baby 
Suggs’s much-quoted sermon, which so passion-
ately urges a return to the flesh, understands that 
self-possession has to be courted … This is why 
her song is also a blazon of body parts: ‘backs 
that need support; shoulders that need arms … 
love your neck; put a hand on it, grace it, stroke it, 
and hold it up” … Here the instructions for loving 
the ‘natural’ body articulate this poignant and 
melancholic gesture of almost orthopedic recon-
struction, of carefully tacking a scaffold of the 
body as a prop for one’s psyche.”
“FOR ONE WEEK ONLY, (Owing to other engagements.) 
Unprecedented Attraction...,” 1842, American Broadsides 
and Ephemera, series 1, no. 6010. 10F45405EC316290.
“objectification, n.2”. OED Online. March 2019. 
Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/129623?redirectedFrom=objectification#eid. Accessed 
Feb 18, 2019.
“orientalism, n.3”. OED Online. March 2019. 
Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/132531?redirectedFrom=orientalism#eid. Accessed 
Feb 18, 2019.
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The 24th annual United Nations Climate Conference, 
or COP24, concluded on December 15th with a tepid  
agreement that will do little to address our global 
climate crisis – or perhaps nothing at all, if nations 
continue to ignore the emissions reductions pledges 
 that they made three years ago in Paris. I attended 
the first week of the COP, which was held in Katowice, 
the polluted heart of Poland’s coal country. (There 
was much fighting over what the location symbol-
ized.)1 What struck me was not that the conference 
ended with a middling accord desperately hashed 
out over a sleepless final weekend – we have come  
to expect little more from these international gath-
erings – but that all the delegates and diplomats  
in attendance seemed to know exactly what would 
stymie the negotiations before they even started. 
There was, they all insisted, one stubborn missing 
ingredient: “political will.”
Over the past few years, “political will” has become 
commonplace in environmental politics – a byword 
for some mysterious missing resource that would, 
were we to harness it, unleash a wave of global 
action to stop climate change.2 In Katowice, I heard 
“political will” invoked often enough to make for an 
excellent drinking game. The call came from the 
press: “Limiting warming to 1.5C is possible – if there 
is political will,” ran a Guardian headline; “Countries 
struggle to muster political will to tackle climate  
crisis,” wrote the Climate Action Network. From 
activists and academics: “The main difference 
between possibility and impossibility is just political 
will,” pronounced Chris Weber of the World Wildlife 
Fund; “The final tick box is political will,” said Jim 
Skea, a prominent climate scientist. And from UN 
officials, most frequently UN Secretary-General 
Antonio Guterres, who raced from conference room 
to conference room extolling “leadership and ambi-
tion … the political will to fight climate change …  
a firm political will,” as if by repeating the words 
over and over he could somehow coax such a will 
into existence. 
Why this fixation on political will? In part because 
all of the other necessary conditions for climate 
action are, at this point, present and accounted for. 
Gina McCarthy, the former head of the now-gutted 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), recently 
remarked, “We have the scientific knowledge, we 
have the financial capacity, and we have the techni-
cal capacity to be able to address this. What we’re 
essentially lacking is political will.”
McCarthy is right. Scientific knowledge: COP24 
came on the heels of the latest (and grimmest)  
report from the IPCC, the international authority 
on climate science, which documented the cat-
astrophic effects of even 1.5 degrees Celsius of 
warming above pre-industrial levels and concluded 
that, to avoid those effects, we would need to halve 
our global emis-sions in the next twelve years. 
Financial capacity: a rapid transition to a zero-emis-
sions world would be financially difficult but by no 
means impossible, and it would certainly save jobs 
and money compared to the alternative. (According 
to a recent U.S. government report that the Trump 
Administration tried to bury by releasing it on Black 
Friday, a business-as-usual approach to climate 
policy would slice 10% off America’s GDP by 2100.) 
Technical capacity: renewable energy is readily 
available and easily scalable – it has been for quite 
some time. Environmental science, environmen-
tal economics, and environmental technology are 
soldiers ready for deployment, waiting for an order 
from their commander-in-chief: politics.3
And yet the desperate search for political will, even 
when all these other elements stand at the ready, 
indicates that somewhere along the line a grave 
misstep has occurred. For decades, the modern 
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of the legislature” to guard against self-inter-
ested landowners who might exhaust the nation’s 
resources. The environment had become political, 
but only as a means for government expansion.  
It was not (yet) an end unto itself. 
Resource management meant extending politics  
into nature. But it also had the effect of granting  
the environment that key political quality – agency – 
that it formerly lacked. Malcolm Bull, in his fasci-
nating essay on the idea of idleness in mid-20th 
century environmental economics, offers this telling 
quotation from a 1926 speech by Gifford Pinchot, 
head of the US Forest Service and later the Governor 
of Pennsylvania:
We have vast stretches of idle forest land. It 
brings no good to anyone. It pays little or no taxes, 
keeps willing hands out of work, builds no roads, 
supports no industries, kills railroads, depopu-
lates towns, creates a migratory population, all of 
which work against a good and stable citizenship. 
Idle forest serves no one well. It is a menace to 
our normal national life.
Pinchot personifies the land, but not in a traditional 
(or biblical) Mother-Nature way. Here the idle for-
est is the idle citizen, a deadbeat who forfeits her 
obligations – her political duties – to her community. 
In other words, it had become possible to speak of 
nature as a truly political entity, an agent in a symbi-
otic relationship with human beings. This language 
stuck: in 1961 another head of the Forest Service, 
Edward Cliff, another head of the Forest Service, 
echoed Pinchot when he declared that “nonproduc-
tive, misused and idle woodlands will add nothing to 
the economic and cultural foundation upon which 
our future as a nation and a civilization depend.” As 
Bull notes, the idea of having “full employment” of 
natural resources – and the notion that the natural 
world could, by remaining idle, shirk its civic duties 
– meant that there was no meaningful distinction 
between the idleness of men and the idleness of 
nature. Both were political concerns. (The idea that 
the state should correct for economic idleness in 
its citizens is a development in political economy 
that we ought to scrutinize outside of its environ-
mental implications – though that is perhaps beyond 
the scope of these books, and certainly beyond the 
scope of this review.)
This remarkable conceptual shift marks the begin-
ning of the modern history of “the environment.” It is 
also where Nature, Action and the Future hands off 
its historical account to The Environment. Though 
Warde, Robin and Sorlin begin their history of the 
environment in the mid-1800s with Carlyle, they 
date the modern environmental era to 1948, a year 
in which two bestselling polemics that warned 
of a coming environmental apocalypse – William 
Vogt’s Road to Survival and Fairfield Osborn’s Our 
Plundered Planet – signaled the inauguration of a 
new way of thinking about our relationship to nature. 
The modern concept of “environment” was shaped, 
the authors argue, by four political fixations of the 
postwar era: an urge to make predictions (often 
apocalyptic ones) about the future of our planet; 
a deference to scientific expertise to judge those 
predictions; a faith in the numbers and models 
that constituted that expertise; and a tendency to 
expand the scope of those models to a global level, 
and so transform “the environment” from a term 
about local circumstances to a “truly global issue, 
which could be scaled to any nation and locality, and 
[which] no nation could treat … in isolation.” Warde, 
Robin and Sorlin set out to document how that trans-
formation occurred. 
To do this, they make an explicit shift away from the 
tendency in intellectual history to trace the devel-
opment of an idea by scrutinizing the scribblings 
of a lineage (often quite an arbitrary one) of famous 
political thinkers. “Ideas are not just shaped by lone 
people,” they write, “but just as much in conference 
halls and laboratories.” Our modern concept of the 
environment, in particular, “became the aggregate 
of techniques and institutions that shaped the idea 
more than individuals.” That, incidentally, is a criti-
cism that we might direct at Smith and Forrester’s 
collection, whose essays tend to focus on pre-
cisely the elite theory and lone scribblers that The 
Environment wants to eschew. 
This shift in focus from the individual to the 
institutional is one of the great strengths of The 
Environment. But if Smith and Forrester perhaps 
lean too heavily on a small group of writers who 
come to represent all of political thought, Warde, 
Robin and Sorlin suffer from the opposite problem. 
Their approach invites a frustrating, vague passiv-
ity: while it may be true that “the environment was 
nobody’s intention,” readers do need a story to hold 
onto, and Warde, Robin and Sorlin refuse to settle 
for a clear cast of historical actors.
In chapters on the study of population growth, ecol-
ogy and climate change, The Environment builds 
toward its central claim: that the modern history of 
“the environment” is that of an ever-ballooning con-
cept under which local concerns swelled into “global 
objects.” In the 1960s, a group of neo-Malthusian 
population theorists – led by Paul Ehrlich and his 
bestselling work The Population Bomb – popularized 
a view of the world which “saw resources as a finite 
part of a global system.” The idea of a resource-lim-
ited, interconnected Earth also seeped into ecol-
ogy, a field once concerned with localized studies 
of conservation techniques that rapidly turned its 
attention in the 1970s to models of a global ecosys-
tem in which even the smallest of local shifts could 
have planet-wide effects. And with the widespread 
recognition of climate change that began in the 
1980s, “the environment” came to represent not only 
a global natural world, but also a global civilization. 
If the environment “encompassed the whole planet,” 
and if our (local) actions were shaping its character, 
then we needed a global forum to figure out how to 
act. By the late 1980s, “the environment” had become 
“an expertise that created a new global politics.”
Which brings us to what we have today: a global 
politics of the environment that places a premium 
on predictions, models, expertise, and a sense of 
interconnectedness. Every year we receive the latest 
round of climate forecasts from the IPCC, a body 
that commands respect in international climate 
politics precisely because it is apolitical: an inter-
national group of scientists who evaluate thousands 
of papers and models and condense them into one 
set of objective forecasts for policymakers. Those 
policymakers then attend a series of UN-hosted con-
ferences – like COP24 this past December – at which 
the IPCC scientists present their report and try to 
convince all the world’s nations to turn their science 
into politics. More often than not, those attempts 
fail. But what we do get are more reports – more 
models, predictions, and deference to experts – from 
a host of acronymed international bodies like UNEP, 
UNFCCC and IEA. And so this cycle, which produces 
what Warde, Robin and Sorlin call “an internationally 
active and restlessly conferencing alliance of scien-
tists” but fails to translate that international science 
into international politics, continues. 
Warde, Robin and Sorlin argue that this history 
underscores the main problem with our current 
state of affairs: our idea of “the environment” is 
now global, but our politics are not. We have proven 
ourselves capable of conceiving of nature as a single 
interconnected ecosystem – that is the intellectual 
journey traced in The Environment. But we can-
not yet do the same for politics. (“The Earth Is One 
but the World Is Not,” they title one of their chap-
ters.) The politics that take place inside our global 
environmental movement has operated with an 
implicit assumption that if the science were unani-
mous, the technology available, and the economics 
sound – and if we could convince everyone of those 
evident truths – then good environmental politics 
would follow. This equation has now proven itself 
false many times over. Today, most Americans do 
believe that climate change is real: according to the 
Yale Climate Opinion Map for 2018, 70 percent of 
Americans believe global warming is happening,  
77 percent support regulating carbon dioxide emis-
sions, and 79 percent believe schools should teach 
about global warming. We have all the sufficient  
conditions, but the politics have not followed.4
So the question then becomes: why is it that the 
modern environmental political movement has  
been unable to generate political will? Three expla-
nations are often proposed. Journalists, who tend 
to search for proximate causes, have shown how 
self-interested and often corrupt industries – energy 
producers, Big Agra, car manufacturers – have lob-
bied against environmental regulation with a suc-
cess unrivalled in modern times (except, perhaps,  
by cigarette companies). Historians have focused  
on how the environmental movements have con-
fronted those industries, and why those confrontations 
have failed. And political theorists, their philosophi-
cally-inclined confrères, have homed in on our  
ethical assumptions about what we, as carbon- 
producing citizens of developed nations, owe to  
our fellow humans.5
Although each of these explanations is true, the 
three books under review point to a deeper and per-
haps more fundamental problem with environmental 
politics. Their methodological approach is to focus 
on the evolution of the words and concepts that have 
shaped our environmental concerns. Taken together, 
they offer an intellectual history – inevitably incom-
plete and sometimes scattershot, but nonetheless 
crucial and enlightening – of some five-hundred 
years of Western ideas of nature and their relation-
ship to politics. To survey that history is to realize 
just how absent concerns about the natural world 
have been in our political traditions. And it is also  
to realize that when the environment did become 
political, it carried with it an intellectual geneal-
ogy that has hamstrung the modern environmental 
movement to this day. 
II
We might begin with the unfortunate truth that for 
much of Western history the natural world was 
not just outside the political realm; “nature” and 
“politics” were antithetical to one another. That is 
the main theme of Nature, Action and the Future, a 
collection of essays assembled by Katrina Forrester 
and Sophie Smith. Though both Forrester and Smith 
now teach political theory (at Harvard and Oxford, 
respectively), both studied history at Cambridge, and 
Nature, Action and the Future is a welcome attempt 
to bridge those two disciplines by “showing how the 
history of political thought can be used to address 
environmental problems.” (Quentin Skinner, the 
godfather of the Cambridge school of intellectual 
history, which emphasizes the importance of always 
locating ideas in their precise historical moments, 
contributes an afterword to the collection.) In order 
to “place environmental ideas into a wider political, 
economic, and philosophical context,” Forrester 
and Smith have assembled a group of historians of 
Western political thought—who are not experts on 
environmental history—and have asked them to con-
sider how the thinkers they study conceived of the 
relationship between politics and the natural world. 
In response to that prompt, many of the essays in 
this book simply and convincingly deny the premise: 
there is no way to understand environmental ideas 
in a political context, because for much of Western 
history, the natural world was defined as that which 
was outside the political. Annabel Brett’s essay, 
which is the first in the collection and focuses on 
early modern Europe, argues that this distinction 
between “nature” and “the political” lies at the core 
of the modern Western political tradition. With few 
exceptions, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
European intellectuals defined politics as “centrally 
concerned with relations between human beings, not 
between human beings and anything else.” Animals 
could have “natural rights,” but never political ones; 
the same went for land. This was because admission 
into the political realm required agency – the ability 
to articulate and to act on decisions. These “strong 
conditions on agency,” Brett concludes, “mean that 
conceptions of the land as an agent or partner in 
[political] community…are very hard to find.”
The only way that nature could take on a political 
meaning was through the idea of a homeland, or 
patria. Brett cites Henning Arnisaeus and Alberico 
Gentili, two seventeenth-century political scientists 
who argued that one’s “native soil” played an import-
ant role in determining one’s political community. 
Arnisaeus used this idea of patria to argue against 
dual-citizenship. Gentili, writing of the Roman 
destruction of Carthage, proposed that our native 
land, “the region to which our eyes have become 
accustomed,” not only gave us a distinct nationality 
but also shaped the way we see the world – and so 
one’s political affinities become tethered to one’s 
location. But, as Brett acknowledges, the kind of pol-
itics that patria provides – narrowly local and often 
nationalistic – is not a desirable tradition for the 
modern environmental movement to take up. And it 
remains an exception to the rule: for early modern 
Europeans, the natural world had no place in politics. 
This anti-political idea of nature remains baked 
into the more recent concept of “the environment.” 
As Paul de Warde, Libby Robin, and Sverker Sorlin 
(all environmental historians) demonstrate in The 
Environment: A History of the Idea, the term only 
entered the English lexicon in the mid-1820s. In 
1827, British reactionary Thomas Carlyle borrowed 
the word from the French environs – “surroundings” 
– and used it to describe the circumstances that 
shaped great men. This definition of “environment” 
as “those extrinsic conditions that shape the real 
object of the study or story” remained dominant in 
Europe for most of the nineteenth century. The envi-
ronment changed us, affected the way we act – but it 
was never a protagonist, and thus always peripheral 
to the (human) world of politics. When sociologists 
such as Herbert Spencer and early ecologists began 
to narrow the term to mean natural surroundings, 
this anti-political sense continued to hold. The envi-
ronment could influence political actors, but it was 
itself a stable, agentless force. The idea of “envi-
ronmental politics” in Carlyle’s time would be an oxy-
moron. Slowly, in fits and starts over the course of 
the nineteenth and early twenty centuries, “environ-
mental politics” began to make sense – not because 
our idea of “the environment” moved closer to the 
political realm, but because politicizing the natural 
world became a useful tool for the state.
The historical essays in Nature, Action and the 
Future trace this development across multiple 
European countries. In Germany, resource man-
agement – especially of wood and forested land – 
offered a welcome avenue for the state to extend  
its control into local politics (as local as a single 
farm) that were previously beyond its boundaries. 
Thus one finds nineteenth-century German politi-
cians calling for a coordinated effort to regulate  
the timber industry and forest management, an 
effort that, in the words of one German forester, 
“only the state can manage.” Likewise in England, 
where prominent naturalists like James Hutton 
argued that the safeguarding of woodlands and  
prudent husbandry of soils required “the wisdom  
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environmental institutions remain “stubbornly 
local.” They conclude that “Environmental politics 
has been, in large part, a history of trying to build 
political institutions that could match the scope and 
ambition of the concept.”
What we have, then, is a history in which our idea of 
nature has remained out of sync with our idea of the 
political, the one forever circling the other as though 
in gimbal lock. Where once “the environment” was 
a concept trying to catch up to the requirements of 
politics, now our understanding of “the political” is 
struggling to catch up to the requirements of “the 
environment.” That is the history – and the present 
dilemma – that these two books offer us. 
III
When we do reach a coherent form of environmental 
politics – when the scope of the political aligns with 
the scope of “the environment” – what will that look 
like? That is the opening question in Geoff Mann 
and Joel Wainwright’s Climate Leviathan: A Political 
Theory of our Planetary Future. Like many of the 
contributors to Nature, Action and the Future, Mann 
and Wainwright are not specialists in environmental 
politics, and their primary academic interests – in 
political economy and critiques of liberal capitalism 
– guide their foray into climate change. Unlike those 
contributors, though, Mann and Wainwright don’t 
want to plumb the genealogies of our current envi-
ronmental concepts. Theirs is a “speculative mode” 
styled after Hobbes (whence the title) and Marx, two 
thinkers who wrote during moments of acute polit-
ical crisis where an old order seemed to be fading 
and a new one had yet to come into view. Though 
this self-conscious emulation feels overblown (this 
book is no Communist Manifesto), it does allow 
Mann and Wainwright to adopt a more biting polem-
ical tone. Climate Leviathan is a helpful reminder 
that political theorists should offer something more 
ambitious than the dry thought experiments – what 
Clifford Geertz called “the little stories Oxford 
philosophers like to make up for themselves” – that 
have overrun the field.
Climate Leviathan takes as its premise the conclu-
sion to which Nature, Action and the Future and The 
Environment have led us. “Our technical understand-
ing of the physical processes driving climate change 
has run far ahead of our explanations of the social 
and political processes driving these physical pro-
cesses,” write Mann and Wainwright. They want to 
know what will happen when our conception of polit-
ical processes catches up to our idea of environmen-
tal ones. They assume that our modern idea of the 
environment and our idea of politics are, by virtue of 
climate change, bound to collide within the next few 
decades. One will change to accommodate the other.
According to Mann and Wainwright, that alignment 
could play out in four “formations” that fall along two 
different axes: capitalist or non-capitalist, and “plan-
etary sovereignty” or “anti-planetary sovereignty.”  
A capitalist and planetary regime – which they believe 
to be the most likely response to climate change 
– they call “Climate Leviathan.” (Think the UN, but 
with more power.) A capitalist and anti-planetary 
order leaves us with “Climate Behemoth,” where 
each nation regulates its own environment and the 
idea of a global system is scuttled— something like 
Trumpism. “Climate Mao” would mean a non-capital-
ist but planetary system: authoritarian, but appeal-
ing because it might yield quick action against 
carbon emitters. And a non-capitalist, anti-planetary 
sovereignty system – which would require a political 
economy that is neither communist nor capitalist, 
national nor global – they label “Climate X.” 
Although Climate X is what Mann and Wainwright 
want us to move toward, they fail to provide any 
meaningful description of what an anti-capitalist, 
anti-planetary politics would look like. To “glimpse” 
Climate X, they urge us to “bundle together the most 
radical strategies of the climate justice movement – 
mass boycott, divestment, strike, blockade, reci-
procity.” But it is difficult to imagine that bundle as 
anything more than a jumble of angry voices, and 
Climate Leviathan’s appeal to “Climate X” never 
manages to transcend the understandable but 
unhelpful stage of protest that cries “down with the 
system!” over and over again.
Mann and Wainwright’s valuable focus on econom-
ics and their discussion of Climate Leviathan make 
their book far more interesting than the other two 
under review here. “Any substantial attempt to 
come to grips with climate change must contend 
with capitalism,” they write. And their contention is 
that capitalism, with its insatiable drive for growth 
and progress and its proclivity to encourage vast 
inequality, has stymied and will continue to stymie 
humane environmental politics at every turn. The 
“liberal, capitalist order” is what makes our idea of 
politics incompatible with care for the environment. 
“Capitalism may not be the only problem” facing the 
environmental movement, they concede. “But it is 
surely one of the big ones.”
The idea that the modern environmental movement 
has been undermined by global capitalism is not 
new. Naomi Klein, a journalist and academic whose 
2014 bestseller This Changes Everything made her 
the darling of environmental activists the world 
over, has argued that environmental politics began 
in earnest at the precise moment (1988, she says) 
that liberal capitalism triumphed over communism 
and economic globalization took off. This conflu-
ence was, Klein suggests, the ultimate roadblock to 
climate action. She memorably termed it a case of 
“epic bad timing.”
But the history of our idea of the environment 
sketched by these three books suggests that the 
simultaneous rise of the modern idea of “the envi-
ronment” and the kind of liberal, capitalist, global 
economy that Climate Leviathan condemns is not 
simply a case of “bad timing.” Rather, our conception 
of a global capitalist economy and our conception of 
“the environment” share several striking similarities. 
The four dimensions that shaped the modern idea 
of “the environment” – predictive; scientific; mod-
ellable; and almost infinitely scalable – could just  
as well apply to a globalized capitalist economy. 
Though Mann and Wainwright never make this 
connection explicit, reading Climate Leviathan with 
these two other histories in the background makes 
it difficult to ignore. Perhaps this is part of why we 
have such trouble aligning “the environment” with 
the political – not because our idea of the natural 
world lies beyond the bounds of what counts in 
politics, but because our contemporary idea of the 
environment relies on the same conceptual tools as 
does our current political economy. If this is indeed 
true, it would force environmentalists to confront 
an uncomfortable paradox. Our modern idea of “the 
environment,” which we so often invoke to summon 
our fellow citizens to climate action, is part of the 
same intellectual history – the same family tree –  
as the global capitalist politics that, if we buy  
Mann and Wainwright’s argument, is antithetical  
to climate action. 
IV
In his infamous 1969 essay, “Meaning and 
Understanding in the History of Ideas,” Quentin 
Skinner ruthlessly scolded historians and political 
theorists for deriving “dateless wisdom” and “uni-
versal ideas” from historical texts. This search for 
“perennial questions” was, he asserted, poor schol-
arship. And it was also a very narrow-minded way 
of learning from the past. Historians of political 
thought ought not to rummage through history in 
search of old answers to our current political ques-
tions. Rather, Skinner argued, the point of docu-
menting how ideas change over time is to discover 
questions and concepts that are not familiar to us 
today. We can use the past as a way to imagine a dif-
ferent future – to realize that “we may be freer than 
we sometimes suppose.” Annabel Brett, who studied 
under Skinner, puts his mantra well in a more recent 
essay: “In trying to unravel the mental worlds of the 
past, we give ourselves the opportunity to re-weave 
our own.”6
Can these histories of our idea of “the environment” 
and its intersection (or lack thereof) with political 
thought give us the tools to re-weave our contempo-
rary idea of environmental politics? In his afterword 
to Nature Action and the Future, Skinner backs away 
from his normally-hopeful stance that intellectual 
history can free us in the present. He strikes a much 
more despondent tone. “We are ill-equipped by our 
inherited traditions of thinking about the natural 
world to deal adequately with our current predica-
ment,” he writes. “The more one contemplates the dis-
junction between what is scientifically necessary and 
what is politically possible, the more it seems hard to 
end on anything but a deeply pessimistic note.”
It is true that after reading these three books that 
document the way we have thought about the natural 
world across some five-hundred years of Western 
history, one might come away thinking that we are 
trapped. The way we think about nature is strongly 
rooted in a kind of anti-politics. And when our idea 
of “the environment” did make its way toward the 
political realm, it ended up overshooting the polit-
ical entirely and gave us an environmental politics 
that is too global, too technical, and perhaps too 
reliant on the same intellectual structures that 
sustain the kind of political economy that seems 
only to exacerbate climate change. When delegates 
and diplomats paced the halls of the UN Climate 
Conference in Katowice this past month bemoaning 
(and contributing to) a lack of “political will,” perhaps 
they were getting at a more profound – and, we might 
fear, a more intractable – historical problem.
And yet Skinner’s pessimism undermines his own 
earlier argument about what the history of ideas 
can do for us in the present. Good intellectual 
history helps to reveal the origins of our current 
predicaments. A certain amount of fatalism is to be 
expected – the ideas that got us into this mess are 
unlikely to be the ones that will get us out. But the 
point of Skinner’s 1969 essay was to suggest that we 
could look to history, and especially the history of 
political thought, to find different ideas, long-forgot-
ten and discarded, that could offer us a new way of 
thinking about a dilemma in the present. 
With these three books, historians of political 
thought have done an excellent job of showing why 
our inherited traditions in the West have left us 
ill-prepared to face climate change – and why we 
have largely excluded the environment from our 
politics altogether. The task for those historians now 
is to shrug off late-Skinner’s pessimism and follow 
early-Skinner’s method. We must search for those 
past traditions which, precisely because they have 
not shaped our impotent idea of environmental  
politics in the present, might offer us some hope  
for the future.
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DRAWINGS
ALEJANDRO NODARSE
These drawings and this poem (overleaf) 
were part of a January show at the Ezra 
Stiles College gallery called (De)positions:  
An Homage to Pontormo, conceived by 
Alejandro Nodarse.
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POEM
MARGARET (MIGS) GRABAR SAGE
Not around but under, through,
between the bones or whatever holds
you up. There will be no
touching you now. Just burrowing
burrowing through to the bottom of you
however bright or brined in death, however sorry
I’ll be to sink my flighty fingers in
where your splinters split so thin they flow.
The place is sterile, coldest bath
of sunlight save on me, in aging flesh
with toes already pointing off of cliffs
I’ve never seen. The bodies here are strung
like rubber bands from peg to peg.
The bodies here are clothed in water
like the rain-clouds, like I hope
they would have wanted. I am bound
by nothing solid save the rinds,
the crusts and pits and peels that lie
in waves along the sand when all has dried
and I have gone to tide me over.
Note: This poem imagines the inner life of Jacopo Pontormo  
as he painted his dazzling Deposition on the Cross. It was 
written as part of a multidisciplinary exhibit centered on 
reinterpreting the painting as well as the painter himself. This 
poem is a sort of ekphrasis on the painting, but it also draws 
on Pontormo’s diaries, in which he recorded what foods he ate 
nearly every day, along with other details of consumption—quo-
tidian worries over waste and the passage of time. A typical 
entry goes like this: “Saturday, fasted. Sunday evening, which 
was the evening of Palm Sunday, I ate a little boiled mutton 
and salad, and had to eat three quattrini of bread.” Sometimes 
the painter records how his body feels, and often he sketches 
in the margins of the journal. On June 9th, 1554, all he writes 
is this: “Marco Moro began to prepare the walls and fill in the 
cracks in San Lorenzo.” Such lines are a reminder of everything 
these “diaries,” an obsessive and idiosyncratic set of records, 
lack. But there is also something marvelous in these unre-
hearsed observations, a poetry if you will, that makes me think 
I’m getting just a little closer to the painter himself.
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LIBERATION  
BY SOIL
ASHIA AJANI
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RECOGNIZES THAT ENVIRONMENTAL BURDENS, 
such as industrial factory placement and lack of 
access to healthy food, are also matters of race, gen-
der and socioeconomic status. The concept arguably 
hails back to the Civil Rights Movement and has 
evolved so that its work no longer only involves com-
batting the unequal distribution of environmental 
burdens. It is also a rallying cry to return to sustain-
able, communal roots. Alongside proponents of lib-
eration work––the effort to redefine our relationship 
to the current state, to take institutional power and 
return that power to people who have been histor-
ically marginalized––proponents of environmental 
justice are committed to creating alternatives to 
extractivist farming techniques, which cause soil 
erosion, water pollution and rely heavily on pesti-
cides and other chemicals. By growing our own food, 
creating our own markets, and rebuilding our own 
communities––thus asserting our autonomy on the 
land––we subvert the notion that we are reliant on 
current, oppressive systems for survival. 
On Soul Fire Farm, a seventy-two acre farm in 
upstate New York that is on the original territory of 
the Mohawk and Munsee people, Leah Penniman 
and her team live out the principles of environmen-
tal justice and liberation work. There they grow 
healthy, organic produce that is rooted in the cul-
tural histories of Black and Brown people. Okra, cas-
sava, leafy greens and herbs fill the wide expanse of 
hills. Children ages five through eighteen weed, sow 
and cook produce. Sometimes they go on scaven-
ger hunts in the surrounding forest. They speak to 
the trees; the trees communicate back to them by 
sharing water and anaerobic resources.  On the land 
of  Soul Fire Farm, everything seems a practice of 
symbiosis. 
In Farming While Black: Soul Fire Farm’s Practical 
Guide to Liberation on the Land (2018), Penniman, 
the farm’s founder, uses her own experience on this 
farm, historical analysis and reference, spiritual 
practice, liberation politics, technical information, 
and ecological science to create a holistic guide to 
tending the land, written specifically for people of 
color interested in the sustainable food movement. 
Farming While Black reads like a basic instruction 
manual for how to acquire land and establish your 
farm business. Yet Penniman has greater ambitions. 
This book shows how deep the roots of removal, 
oppression, and cultural innovation run in farming 
and food practices. It is a testament to the ances-
tors who paved the way, and a call to return to our 
ancestral ways of life through their farming prac-
tices, communal economics, and spiritual work. 
Penniman founded Soul Fire Farm in 2011 with the 
mission to “reclaim our inherent right to belong to 
the earth and have agency in the food system as 
Black and Brown people.” She describes herself as 
a “multiracial, light-skinned, raised-rural, northeast-
ern, college-educated, cisgendered, able-bodied, 
Jewish-Vodun practicing biological mother who grew 
up working class.” Growing up as a brown child in 
a predominantly white community lead her to seek 
empowerment and security in natural spaces. She 
writes that the land will tell you when you belong to 
it. When she visited plot of earth that would become 
Soul Fire Farm, it told her to wait. She returned with 
offerings, and the land welcomed her and her kin.
Part of Penniman’s mission is helping farmers of 
color claim ownership of the land, which is particu-
larly powerful given the lack of resources available 
to Black farmers and non-Black farmers of color 
in a world that largely depends on their labor and 
innovation. Due to the history of slavery, oppres-
sion, and marginalization, Black and Native peoples 
are frequently left out of larger discussions about 
farming practices, or find it difficult to acquire loans 
for land purchases.  Penniman asserts that land 
is the basis of liberation: how can people of color 
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become liberated if they do not have access to land 
resources? For her, redefining relationships to the 
land is an important step toward land stewardship, 
and an important step toward healing. Once we 
stop seeing land as the thing that oppresses us, and 
instead view it as the thing that has always pro-
tected us, the healing can begin. 
The book also serves as a call for white people 
to reevaluate their relationship to the land.  In a 
section entitled “White People Uprooting Racism,” 
Penniman  discusses how the concept of whiteness  
removes culture and ancestry from white identified 
people by replacing European roots with a false 
origin. Whiteness has no origin rooted in place. It is 
an ideology used to oppress other groups of people. 
Penniman later provides discussion questions about 
cultural appropriation, what it means to be anti-racist 
versus non-racist, and how white people can be better 
advocates for marginalized people. How do these 
skills relate to land stewardship and agriculture? 
White people own upwards of ninety-eight percent 
of the rural land in the United States, whereas Black 
people own about one percent, and most ancestral 
indigenous land is held in “trusts” by the United 
States federal government. Penniman calls for white 
advocates to redistribute their unearned wealth, have 
tough conversations about race and inequality with 
other white people, and invest their time and money 
in historically marginalized communities. 
For someone unfamiliar with the agricultural indus-
try, Farming While Black may seem overwhelming 
and complicated. Penniman has gathered a lot of 
material, ranging from the practice of squatting 
and how it can be a form of temporary land ten-
ure to agroforestry for soil restoration. It is a thick, 
difficult read. But as we come upon an era of both 
self-reflection and environmental (social) crisis, it 
is a necessary tool in the fight against injustice and 
climate change. It not only provides history, but it 
treats the knowledge and application of that history 
as a solution to many problems, whether they be 
racial, socioeconomic or environmental. What would 
the world look like if farms followed the model of 
sustainable, culturally-significant agriculture that is 
embodied by Soul Fire Farm? What if students had a 
place where they could learn not only about agricul-
ture, but about the legacies of innovation and resis-
tance to historical models of agriculture? What if we 
all remembered that we came from somewhere, and 
that while intergenerationally we have experienced 
pain and removal, there are productive steps we can 
take and a community to remind us that we have 
purpose and worth? 
One has to question the applicability of farming 
techniques in upstate New York to farms in places 
like Phoenix, Arizona or Seattle, Washington, where 
the weather and the growability of various crops dif-
fer greatly. But Penniman does not set out to create 
a blanket solution to global or even national agricul-
tural problems. What she does is provide the reader 
with options and perspectives—even readers who are 
not looking to get involved with agricultural systems 
directly. Penniman emphasizes movement building 
and the ways consumers can combat exploitative 
agriculture practices through boycotts, economic 
and emotional support, and by teaching children 
about sustainable, intersectional agriculture. 
More than anything, Farming While Black asks us to 
recognize that food is not just something we eat. It 
is not just a commodity or something with which we 
nourish our bodies.  It has significant cultural and 
ecological roots that we cannot ignore. When some-
one knows where their food comes from, when they 
have meaningful involvement in the cultivation and 
protection of the land that births their food, they are 
much more willing to protect Mother Earth, to see 
other human beings as their siblings in the rever-
ence of earth systems. 
ESSAY
DIMITRI DIAGNE
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FINDING EUROPE
DIMITRI DIAGNE
IN BUDAPEST, IN THE SQUARE OUTSIDE ST. ISTVÁN BASILICA, there 
is a Christmas market. After worrying about a truck 
attack for a split second, I entered. They were sell-
ing Christmas market things—mulled wine, hot choc-
olate, fried dough, fruit brandy, smiling snowmen, 
plastic reindeer, Santa figurines of varying quality. It 
was overcast and drizzling. I pictured Christ in the 
temple, turning over merchant’s stands, long hair 
disheveled and plastered to his face, sweeping his 
arms across counters full of pastries, the flesh of 
salmon and fowl, metal boxes of forints, euros, and 
dollars, ripping down strands of LED lights. Maybe 
next year a conceptual artist will dress in linen 
robes and take up this task. Maybe the members 
of an artist collective will go to all the Christmas 
markets of Europe and do it at the same time, some 
dressed in linen robes, some dressed as Charlie 
Brown. 
For all their cheap commercialism, Christmas 
markets bring joy to many. The posh and artful-
ly-lit promenades of Central Budapest, which 
host the main Christmas market, are packed with 
people marching in tight formation from Lacoste 
to Intimissimi Italian lingerie to Zara Home, each 
storefront dripping with icicle lights, an enormous 
glowing tree guiding the way. Stepping into a side 
street feels like stepping out of a slow but powerful 
river full of eddies that disorient and terrify. I prefer 
the slightly quieter, stranger quarters. The Ottoman 
bathhouse where, for about twenty dollars, you can 
sit in a 500-year-old stone tub with old Hungarian 
men in linen loincloths for unlimited time; the tiny 
bar operated semi-legally by an English immigrant 
of Afro-Caribbean origin and frequented by an 
alt-looking crowd; the bookstore-café owned by the 
publisher of László Krasznahorkai’s mind-bending 
novels. I even prefer St. István in the rain. 
From there, I walked towards the parliament, 
through the kind of neighborhood that surrounds 
important government offices. The streets were 
clean and quiet, the buildings grand and featureless. 
Like many somewhat famous and extraordinarily 
photogenic buildings, especially those that imitate 
old styles, the Parliament’s Gothic Revival structure 
was quite boring in person, a strained and self-con-
scious attempt at an anachronistic form of beauty. 
I left quickly. The sun began emerging from the 
clouds as I boarded a yellow tram. It took me along 
the Danube, on whose far bank Buda’s monumental 
architecture lay bathed in golden evening light. 
Budapest looks like a city someone would design 
in Forge of Empires or some other online strategy 
game. Looking across the river from Pest into Buda, 
one sees a Baroque palace in front of a Gothic 
church. Next to that a colossal statue of an angel 
hovers over a medieval citadel, behind a sprawling 
Beaux-Arts hotel-bathhouse. At first glance, there 
is very little to indicate that we are no longer in the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. The historical jumble 
of styles, expressed in their most grandiose forms, 
easily reads against the late-afternoon backdrop as 
a piece of propaganda artwork, a testament to what 
a particular element of Europe sees in a particular 
section of history. It is distinctly Western, distinctly 
opulent, distinctly built to project the grandness 
of what many would like to interpret as a distinctly 
grand European civilization. 
***
Several hundred miles to the south, in Montenegro, 
the distinction is less clear. The country prides 
itself on being the only part of the Balkans that 
remained at least partially autonomous throughout 
the entire Ottoman period. Popular history holds 
that the Empire’s forces were no match for its rug-
ged land and its rugged, warlike clans—one of which 
my maternal great-grandmother was a member. 
A Montenegrin acquaintance offered me a more 
skeptical revision of this story. He suggested that 
the jagged limestone plateaus covered with scrappy 
oak trees were not worth the effort to conquer, so it 
didn’t take much to convince the Ottomans to stop 
trying. In any case, Montenegro held out for hun-
dreds of years despite being completely surrounded 
by Ottoman territory. Meanwhile, on the Empire’s far 
northern frontier, the Hungarians toiled on the ram-
parts of the antemurale christianitatis, the symbolic 
wall between Christian Europe and the Muslim East. 
Perhaps it is out of a feeling of solidarity, then, that 
Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s authoritarian Prime Minister 
and President of the far-right Fidesz Party, donated 
twenty-five kilometers of a new antemurale, in the 
form of barbed wire, to Montenegro this past sum-
mer. I first heard about this gift through that same 
Montenegrin acquaintance, who dryly and half-jok-
ingly hypothesized that Montenegro might achieve 
long-awaited EU accession by becoming part of a 
growing right wing-coalition. This informal group, 
spearheaded by Hungary’s Orbán, and including 
the leadership of Austria, Italy, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Slovakia, along with sizable minority 
parties in France and Germany, is committed to 
drawing a particular kind of boundary for Europe. 
Montenegro could decide to use Orbán’s gift and 
join in this mission. The Hungarian Prime Minister 
almost certainly intends the barbed wire to run 
along Montenegro’s southern border with either of 
two majority-Muslim countries—Albania and Kosovo. 
In an age of globalization, it would help affirm an 
image of Europe as a bastion of Christendom, a 
sharply delineated West. 
In the face of immigration from majority-Muslim 
countries, this ancient and strange mission of 
walling off a particular version of Europe is becom-
ing increasingly fashionable and visible. It is also 
practically impossible—and morally unjustifiable. 
Europe cannot be constituted as a fixed and uniform 
cultural and geographical region, especially in a con-
temporary world drawn together and also ravaged 
by the inequities of global late capitalism. It is these 
inequities that at once make European countries 
desirable destinations and create people in need of 
destinations. Attempts to wall off Europe are a kind 
of trans-boundary ethnonationalism, which, like all 
instances of ethnonationalism, require a dishon-
est smoothing over of history. The idea of a white, 
Christian Europe that is fundamentally separate 
requires rejecting the great historical truth that such 
a Europe is not real. Not only in the sense that the 
creation of the Western European powers was only 
possible through exchange with African, Middle 
Eastern, South Asian, and East Asian societies, and 
later, through the exploits of colonialism. But in the 
sense that Europe, as a coherent cultural and physi-
cal territory, has never really existed.   
***
A National Geographic world map hangs in my child-
hood bedroom. Thanks to its decade-long presence, 
I can recite most national capitals. I can draw from 
memory a decent outline of the Mediterranean 
Sea. France is purplish-blue, Brazil is green, South 
Africa is yellow. Other countries are delineated by 
their own rings of color that fade to clean white as 
you move away from the borders, which appear as 
the crisp, sudden interfaces between two colors. 
Sometimes they are separated by the slender blue 
strand of a river. Some follow the jagged ridge of 
a mountain range (Pyrenees is written above the 
France–Spain border). Some seem to follow nothing 
in particular. These take the form of either straight 
lines (curved to account for the map’s reduction of a 
spherical surface to a flat one) or convoluted mean-
ders, like the vast squiggle between Kazakhstan and 
Russia that bifurcates into the vast squiggles distin-
guishing Mongolia from Russia and China.
Look at a satellite image of Central Asia and these 
boundaries seem absurd, as they ford rivers, wind 
through deserts, and cut across mountain ranges 
and language families. One could make the same 
observation of the US-Mexico border west of the Rio 
Grande, and of countless other fronteirs. The mean-
ing of such a border is not geographic, linguistic, 
cultural, or ecological. Political boundaries denote 
the area over which the international community, 
or some powerful element of that community, has 
acknowledged the sovereign authority of a particu-
lar nation state. Of course this state sovereignty is 
amended, suspended, violated, and ignored so fre-
quently that it rarely exists in its pure form, reveal-
ing just how contrived political borders are.
The borders of continents tend to be less arbitrary 
than those of countries. They are delineated less by 
compromises and treaties than by geology. Floating 
on the slurry of molten rock miles below Earth’s 
surface, there is a North American Plate, a South 
American Plate, an African Plate, an Australian Plate, 
an Antarctic Plate, and a Eurasian Plate, into which 
the Arabian and Indian Plates are smashed. Cracks 
in the Earth’s crust tend to manifest in geographi-
cal features on the surface. South America erupts 
suddenly the bottleneck of the Panamanian Isthmus. 
Australia and Antarctica are surrounded by ocean. 
The Mediterranean and the deep trench of the Red 
Sea separate Africa from Eurasia. But at what point 
on that great landmass does Europe begin?
A high school history teacher of mine described 
Europe as a fractal pattern of peninsulas sticking 
out from the northwest corner of Asia.  For hundreds 
of years, powerful people who lived on this conti-
nental outgrowth have tried to define its eastern 
boundary. Even when it concerns spaces that, like 
continents, aren’t inherently political, geography is 
a politically involved practice. Because continents 
are understood to be rooted in the most concrete 
physical reality, they may offer the most stable and 
irrefutable identity around which to organize politi-
cally. Continents are more than tectonic plates—they 
become cultural associations, parties of solidar-
ity, which take on new political significance in the 
framework of transnational federations and organi-
zations. NAFTA, the African Union, and the EU are 
all based on some notion of continental identity. As 
the EU expands, it becomes more and more geo-
graphically contiguous, constituting a territory of 
adjoining states whose membership in the Union 
can be held up to defend the idea, easily exploited 
by conservative politicians and other xenophobes, 
that a culturally coherent Europe coincides with a 
physically integral Europe. The latter gives the for-
mer the legitimacy of material existence. 
A physical definition turns Europe from a shakily 
defined cultural construct to something literally set 
in stone. But the lack of a clear geological boundary 
leaves a physical definition dependent on cultural 
and political debate. The most successful strat-
egy in this debate has continually proven to be the 
identification of a cultural Other, a group whose 
differences with every culture in whatever area 
someone wants to define as “Europe” exceed the 
differences between those cultures. Since the 8th 
century encounter between the Umayyad Caliphate 
and a Frankish Army led by Charles Martel, this 
other has been Islam, later to be represented by the 
Ottomans. The Other now takes the form of insid-
iously diffuse Middle Eastern and North African 
migrants whose stereotyped image stirs paranoia in 
the minds of many white Europeans, both Christian 
and non-Christian. This contemporary stereotype of 
the Other is not only Muslim, but also dark and poor. 
Each trait is enough to imply the others, and each 
is enough to prohibit inclusion within the ideal of 
Europe. Each represents something that those who 
attempt to draw the boundaries of Europe see their 
continent not to be, something they want to prevent 
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their continent from becoming. This otherness 
appears more legitimate, more fundamental, when it 
is tied to some seemingly objective physical barrier—
the Central Asian nomads beyond the Ural River, the 
Moors across the Strait of Gibraltar, or the Turks 
and Levantines past the Bosporus. When the Muslim 
Other is confined beyond the physical frontiers of 
some contiguous area, Europe is no longer the sub-
jective and viscous concept of Christendom or, even 
more vaguely, Western Civilization, but a concrete, 
stable, unchanging cultural and physical entity. 
Of course, this immutable unity is largely a myth. 
One reason is that groups characterized as Other 
live within areas within any physical definition of 
Europe. Along the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea, 
completely surrounded by the majority Christian 
countries of Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Croatia 
and Greece, lie Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
and Albania—three majority-Muslim countries. Most 
members of their religious majorities trace the ori-
gin of their faith to the Ottoman conquest. The exis-
tence of these three countries is evidence enough 
that no Christian definition of Europe can rely on 
the physicality of the continent. The most it can do 
is attempt to maintain literal fences and equally real 
legal barriers between itself and its foil. This seems 
to be the European Union’s working plan. A map of 
the Schengen Area reveals a large hole, occupied 
by the three majority-Muslim countries and three of 
their four Christian neighbors. Croatia, the excep-
tion, appears with Romania and Bulgaria as part of  
a buffer zone of European Union members that are 
not part of the Schengen Area. The EU has made 
it clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and 
Kosovo, along with Serbia and Montenegro—which 
both have significant Muslim minorities—are not 
part of Europe. 
***
As I was writing this piece, an article by the Bosniak 
writer Riada Ašimović Akyol appeared in the 
Atlantic. She argues that the nation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is living proof that Islam can exist in 
Europe, and has indeed existed there for hundreds 
of years. The standout sentence is the claim that 
“Bosnian Muslims, Albanians, Turks, and others see 
themselves as fully Muslim and fully European.”1 
Akyol suggests that if those who define their con-
tinent against Islam would get hip to the fact that 
entire communities of Muslims are both indige-
nous to geographical Europe and proudly embrace 
European identity, they could stop worrying so much 
about whether recent Muslim arrivals can integrate 
into European society. But this hopeful conclusion 
relies on a premise too general to describe the 
process of identity formation in at least some parts 
of the Western Balkans. Hundreds of years of dis-
course and conflict, combined with the EU’s current 
politics of exclusion, have produced a more compli-
cated situation than the one Akyol describes. Most 
people I’ve talked to in Kosovo, Albanians and Serbs 
alike, do not consider themselves European.  
Two minutes by foot from the new central mosque, 
a gift from Turkey, the hottest bar in Mitrovica 
occupies an old Ottoman bathhouse. On the week-
ends, they’re known to turn people away on the basis 
of their outfits. Behind the counter is a display of 
around thirty bottles of Cîroc vodka. At this bar, a 
couple of months ago, I made a sarcastic comment 
about “you Europeans.” One of my friends chuck-
led. “You think we’re European?” another asked, 
feigning flattery. I thought of geography in terms 
of the map in my bedroom wall. The people I was 
with did not. On the other end of the local glamour 
spectrum are çajtores, small, sparse, unisex cafés 
where men gather to talk and gamble over tiny, 
hourglass-shaped cups of strong black tea that cost 
twenty cents each. “Some young people here can’t 
even afford one of these,” an acquaintance told me 
over a cup at the çajtore I frequent, whose name in 
Albanian translates to “at the hut” and whose design, 
with burlap wallpaper and bark-covered wood panels, 
tries to emulate one. “Things are very bad here. Lots 
of people leave for Europe.” 
Europe, then, is a place to which one travels from 
this country on the Balkan Peninsula. One goes there 
to find functioning train systems, the rule of law, and 
regulations that prevent power plants from pumping 
brown coal smoke into grey winter air. An abundance 
of jobs that don’t require having a well-positioned 
relative, and the freedom to cross international bor-
ders in pursuit of those jobs, in search of education, 
to meet relatives, in a way that—by declaration of the 
EU—Kosovars cannot. Many people say that living 
here can feel like being “trapped.”
A Kosovar Passport is one of the world’s least pow-
erful. Citizens can travel to 14 countries visa-free, 
and thirty-four with a visa on arrival. Not included 
in this number is the United States, the powerful 
ally that occupies a position of special reverence in 
the minds of many Kosovar Albanians. Neither are 
the countries of the European Union, whose flag 
adorns public buildings and infrastructure projects 
throughout the country. Getting a visa for Germany 
or Switzerland, two of the most common destina-
tions for Kosovar immigrants, requires a long wait 
outside an embassy, a barrage of forms, a non-re-
fundable fee of close to one hundred euros (no small 
change in a country where unemployment hovers 
around thirty percent and average monthly income 
at around four hundred euros), and an understand-
ing that in the end, you’re likely to be denied. It 
is a process that many describe as humiliating. 
Similarly humiliating might be boarding a plane at 
the Stuttgart airport, where the flight to Kosovo is 
sequestered in a small, old, far-flung terminal along 
with flights to Hurghada, Egypt and Izmir, Turkey. 
You have to pass through a special passport-check to 
enter the gate area. The terminal serves as quar-
antine for less wealthy, darker-skinned, not-quite 
Europeans. It contains a single food stand that sells 
four-euro coffee. 
Europe is where the money and the power are. This 
is a definitional statement, from the perspective 
of many in Kosovo and in the region. Factions in 
several former Yugoslav countries believe that by 
becoming European, they’ll get access to some 
of that money and power. Hence the possibility of 
Montenegro allying with Orbán’s right wing EU front, 
to prove that they belong on the European side of 
the antemurale. This is a long-standing trend. In 
Race and the Yugoslav Region, Catherine Baker 
relates how in the 1980s, members of Slovenia’s 
nascent independence movement asserted their 
“Europeanness” to contrast themselves with the 
“Balkanness” of their neighboring Republics to the 
South and East.2 Likewise with Croatian nationalists, 
who could emphasize their Catholicism and rela-
tively pale skin. Slovenia and Croatia are both  
members of the European Union. Kosovo is still  
waiting for its citizens to be deemed worthy of  
traveling there.
As Jeton Zulfaj recently observed in Kosovo 2.0,  
a Kosovar online investigative journalism publica-
tion, the European Union’s refusal to grant Kosovo 
visa liberalization is likely at least partially due to 
xenophobia.3 Unlike some nearby countries, Kosovo 
can’t claim to participate in what EU members iden-
tify as cultural Europeanness. Most Kosovars I’ve 
met aren’t interested in becoming fully culturally 
European—if doing so requires assimilating com-
pletely into a Western way of life that many reason-
ably see as alienating, cold, and lonely. It seems that 
Kosovo must wait, then, for the European Union to 
abandon the practice of basing political, social, and 
economic inclusion on some notion of European  
cultural uniformity. 
In the endless debates over whether recent arrivals 
will be able to integrate into European culture and 
adopt European values, it is easy to forget the prem-
ise behind these concepts—the contrast between 
Europe and not-Europe. A fence cannot be built 
around Europe. A line from mountain range, to river, 
to sea cannot mark a barrier between European 
culture and the Other. Europe’s economic power, 
reinforced by a continual reduction of the bodies 
of Black and Brown and not-quite-white people into 
exploitable resources, makes it a resource to others. 
Ability to partake in that resource, and to eventually 
become material partners in it, rather than mal-
treated generators of it, cannot be determined on 
the arbitrary basis of culture. As the world becomes 
more cosmopolitan, and the injustices of Western-
dominated global capitalism come into sharper 
relief, it will only grow more difficult to use mythical 
geographies to support protectionism and exclusion 
on the feeble foundation of “cultural difference.” 
Only a radical openness can create a future that is 
more honest, just, and functional than the past.  
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REVIEWED
THE MUSIC OF
KANYE WEST
OUR COLLECTIVE 
RECORD
NICHOLAS JUDT
THE CRISIS IS FAMILIAR: you love an artist, spend years of 
your life taking in his work and singing its praises, 
nourishing your soul on his art. Then, one day, you 
realize that he is not a good person—he did or said 
something immoral, revolting, inexcusable. The 
verdict is plastered in the headlines and smeared 
across the Internet, impossible to ignore: your favor-
ite artist is a scumbag. So you have to figure out 
what to do. Can you keep listening to and admiring 
his work? Or must you instead do as the newspa-
pers and the newsfeeds demand and abandon ship, 
shouting hurried disavowals of your past devotion 
before you hit the water?
Like many other people, I faced this crisis in 2018. It 
came via my devotion to the work of Kanye West. I 
discovered his music when I entered high school, 
and it blew my world open. I had never heard any-
thing like it before: its propulsive energy, structural 
rigor, and intellectual range taught me what great 
music can be and how to listen to it. I would go 
through cycles where I listened to nothing but a sin-
gle song, “Lost in the World” or “Blood on the Leaves” 
every morning on my way to school. There was some-
thing about West’s music that seemed undeniable 
to me, the progression from word to word and sound 
to sound inevitable in the way of all great poetry. 
As I walked down the street or stood in the subway 
listening, I felt the urge to thrust my headphones 
into the hands of a stranger: listen to this! You have 
no idea of the world I’m living in right now, the world 
this music has given me.
What makes West’s music this good? Perhaps the best 
example is “Blood on the Leaves,” a six-minute tour-
de-force from his 2013 album Yeezus. The backbone 
of the song is a sample from Nina Simone’s version 
of “Strange Fruit,” a haunting song that describes the 
lynching of black Americans. “Strange fruit hanging 
from the poplar trees,” Simone intones. “Blood on the 
leaves.” West begins the song with this sample, and 
then he splinters Simone’s words and scatters them 
throughout the track—the song’s first layer. Next he 
adds an entirely unexpected second layer: a series 
of verses describing a failing celebrity marriage, with 
particular attention lavished on drug use and the 
post-separation division of money. And as the song 
kicks into high gear, West introduces a third layer: an 
extraordinarily forceful and unsettling house-music 
beat, which thumps underneath most of the song.
The first time I heard “Blood on the Leaves,” I was 
bowled over by its raw power. But I was also per-
plexed: what was West’s intention? It seemed offen-
sively mismatched to pair Simone’s evocation of 
lynching with lyrics about a millionaire’s marriage in 
crisis. But this, I came to realize, was precisely the 
point. “Blood on the Leaves” is about the degradation 
of American pop-culture, the ways in which its moral 
center has rotted. West does not want Simone’s 
sample and his verse to fit together—he wants them 
to clash, and for this contrast to upset us. How did 
America go from songs about lynching to songs 
about alimony? There is a conversation happening in 
the song: Simone tries to remind the speaker (heard 
in West’s verses) of the history he has forgotten, but 
he does not listen. He shouts her down, dominating 
the track. All the while, that bludgeoning house-beat 
keeps churning, crushing history under its wheel.
Importantly, West knows that he is part of the cor-
ruption and the forgetting, what with his wealth and 
his vanity. “Blood on the Leaves” is a blow directed 
against itself and its creator—which is why West 
casts his own voice in the role of the self-obsessed 
speaker who cannot seem to hear Simone’s cry 
from the past. The most pointed evidence of this 
self-awareness comes in the song’s climax: a heavily 
auto-tuned West implores himself to “breathe” and 
“live,” even as Simone’s aching description of “black 
bodies swinging in the summer breeze” continues 
in the background. Breathe and live—the two things 
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that a lynched person cannot do. The speaker’s lack 
of self-awareness is galling, but West’s abundance 
of self-awareness makes the song extraordinary. As 
he put it years before on “All Falls Down,” “we all 
self-conscious, I’m just the first to admit it.” 
West accomplishes all of this not through didactic 
explanation, but instead via the counterpoint of 
samples and words, borrowed sounds and frag-
mented melodies. This is the centerpiece of West’s 
brilliance: his ability to play various facets of his 
music against each other, to create nuance and argu-
ment through musical tension. West’s best songs are 
in conversation with themselves, as each facet of the 
music makes its case and their curator assembles 
them into a sonic whole. The participants that West 
draws into this conversation are astonishing in their 
variety, demonstrative of his encyclopedic command 
of music history—his samples range from 1960’s 
Hungarian rock to contemporary hip-hop, touching 
on countless traditions in between. Many artists can 
write a great verse, and many can produce a great 
track; but Kanye West is one of very few who has the 
audacity, the knowledge, and the skill to make music 
that is somehow both at odds with itself and entirely 
sure of its purpose.
***
I always knew that West was, to put it mildly, not very 
agreeable. His arrogance was the stuff of celebrity 
legend. But it never seemed consequential—that was 
gossip, and I was in it for the music. Then came 2018, 
and the situation changed. In April, West emerged 
from a long public absence with a flurry of tweets 
boasting of his support for President Trump. The 
photos of West sporting a “Make America Great 
Again” hat lapped up most of the media attention, 
but they were hardly the only alarming statement 
he made. For instance, he also tweeted “I love the 
way Candace Owens thinks,” giving a thumbs-up 
to the Fox News commentator who claimed that 
Black Lives Matter protesters are “a bunch of whiny 
toddlers, pretending to be oppressed for attention.” 
West’s support for Trump was not an isolated media 
stunt: he had embraced and chosen to broadcast the 
views of the alt-right.
Things got worse a week later with West’s infamous 
visit to the headquarters of the celebrity gossip pub-
lication TMZ. Accompanied and supported by Owens, 
West rattled off a string of appalling statements, and 
justified them in the name of “free thought.” Once 
again, a singularly galling sound-bite sucked up the 
media coverage of West’s appearance: his claim 
that “slavery for 400 years…sounds like a choice.” But 
as with his Twitter rant, there were plenty of other 
claims that largely escaped the public’s attention. 
He enthusiastically repeated Fox News’ racist ‘black-
on-black crime’ talking point. He lauded Trump for 
allowing business owners to bypass regulations and 
increase their profits. Perhaps most upsetting of all, 
he proudly embraced ignorance: “we can talk about 
history, but not too long.” Like the speaker in “Blood 
on the Leaves,” West bullishly shouted down the 
lessons of the past. It was a deplorable show of bad 
politics and bad morals. 
West’s garish behavior continued for months, cul-
minating in a visit to the White House in October. 
Sitting across from Trump, West gave a ten-minute, 
seemingly unprepared speech. There were bits of 
real content sprinkled in—like West’s insightful, if 
bizarrely expressed, take on the 13th Amendment—
but they were drowned in a sea of spurious non-
sense. The President looked thrilled. And then, at 
the end of October, it all seemed to stop. Following 
an apparently minor scuffle with his then-friend 
Owens (the two subsequently parted ways), West 
announced on Twitter: “my eyes are now wide open 
and now realize [sic] I’ve been used to spread mes-
sages I don’t believe in. I am distancing myself from 
politics and completely focusing on being creative.” 
But then, on the first day of 2019, West came circling 
back: “Trump all day,” he tweeted. “Just so in 2019 you 
know where I stand.” The Kanye show was back on 
the air.
When the headlines about West’s comments at TMZ 
first flashed across my phone last spring, I reacted 
with bemusement rather than anger. What he had 
said was jaw-dropping, to be sure, but it seemed 
more like a particularly ugly sideshow than an 
event of real political importance. I rolled my eyes, 
watched a few highlights from the TMZ video, and 
went back to my day. I had been listening to some of 
my favorite West songs all week, and his new com-
ments weren’t about to stop me. The song I had on 
repeat that day was “Runaway.” “You’ve been putting 
up with my shit just way too long,” West rapped into 
my headphones. I smiled.
But as West continued to assert his views, I began to 
realize that his alt-right outburst merited an angrier 
response than I had given. I finally got around to 
watching the TMZ video in its entirety, and I was 
struck by the response of Van Lathan, the black 
TMZ employee who became momentarily famous 
for shouting back at West from across the office 
floor. Lathan told West that there would be “real-
world, real-life consequence” for what he was saying, 
and accused him of ignoring how the President he 
was embracing was a threat to the lives of black 
Americans who don’t live in West’s celebrity bubble. 
What struck me was the intensity of Lathan’s feeling. 
For Lathan, West was not merely another celebrity 
gone off the rails; he was a powerful man doing 
harm to the very community that had made him a 
star. Lathan, in his own words, was “unbelievably 
hurt.”
The magnitude of West’s betrayal fully hit me when 
I read Ta-Nehisi Coates’ blistering essay “I’m Not 
Black, I’m Kanye” the following week. Coates’ piece 
was not solely concerned with West—it was about 
the intersections of celebrity, race, and heritage. But 
what stayed with me was his searing condemnation 
of West’s immorality: “West’s ignorance is not merely 
deep, but also dangerous.” He said that West had 
“chosen collaboration.” He accused West of “lending 
his imprimatur, as well as his Twitter platform of 
some 28 million people [now more than 29], to the 
racist rhetoric of the conservative movement.” He 
argued that West had become “a mouthpiece” for 
America’s most horrific instincts.1 He was right.
As the gravity of West’s remarks sank in, I could have 
abandoned it all, wiped the slate clean and said what 
so many others were saying at that time: I’m done 
with Kanye West. Instead, I found myself going back 
to all of my old West favorites in order to explore my 
conflicted reaction to his public offenses. Would I 
still love his art as much as I had? Would I feel guilt 
or regret about that love? Would the image of West 
in his MAGA hat prompt me to reevaluate his past 
work? It did not; I loved his albums as much as I ever 
had. Still, the conflict between my admiration for 
West’s music and my disdain for his recent remarks 
did not sit well with me. I began constructing a sim-
ple story, one designed as much to exculpate me, the 
listener, as to describe reality: Kanye West was a 
brilliant artist who could not handle fame, stumbled 
into the arms of an evil political movement, and lost 
his former genius. If this turned out to be the case—if 
West had been a great artist, but no longer was—then 
perhaps I didn’t need to reckon with the fact that I 
delighted in the art of a Trump supporter.
Then a burst of new music arrived, fresh on the 
heels of all the controversy, and my simple story 
fell apart. I thought the new albums were terrific. 
West released five albums in May and June. Three 
of them were works he produced for other artists. 
The other two were a solo album entitled ye and a 
collaboration with Kid Cudi entitled Kids See Ghosts. 
Two of the three West-produced albums (Pusha T’s 
Daytona and Teyana Taylor’s K.T.S.E) were excellent: 
tightly constructed, brilliantly produced (West’s hall-
mark), mischievously dirty, and a lot of fun. But the 
core of West’s project lay in ye and Kids See Ghosts, 
and these were the albums to which I found myself 
returning over and over again in the subsequent 
months, drawn in by an orbit of unexpected potency.
ye and Kids See Ghosts are powerful because they 
spring from a spirit of reckless, instinctual, first-
thought-best-thought creative force: “just say it out 
loud, just to see how it feels,” as West says on the 
first track of ye. The result is that they shift form 
constantly, sometimes even mid-song. In the case 
of ye, this shape-shifting is evident from the first 
track, “I Thought About Killing You”: it begins as a 
dark, meditative spoken-word monologue, only to 
transform midway through into a dance track with a 
powerful trap beat. The album is full of such jarring 
pivots—stylistically, structurally, and in content. 
“Yikes” and “All Mine” are energized chunks of brag-
gadocio in which West boasts about his invincibility 
and sexual prowess; “Wouldn’t Leave” and “Violent 
Crimes” are soulful, almost repentant songs in which 
West criticizes himself for his irresponsible behavior 
and his objectification of women, even as he sporad-
ically continues to objectify them. The album does 
not bother to choose between its many seemingly 
contradictory identities—it swerves between them 
at breakneck speed, daring you to come along for 
the ride. Kids See Ghosts is equally impossible to 
pin down, oscillating between jittery, nerve-jangling 
energy and warm, contemplative self-reflection.
The music is a mess, full of intellectual inconsisten-
cies and unpolished lyrics. And it is precisely this 
disarray that is the source of its impact and pro-
fundity. West’s work has always fused vast musical 
knowledge with sheer artistic instinct, and never 
before has he so fully allowed his impulses to take 
over, spilling his influences and contradictions 
and half-made soundscapes onto the tracks. This 
is a different artistic mode than that of “Blood on 
the Leaves.” What distinguished that song was its 
thoughtfulness and intentionality. West had a plan, 
and he executed it. Not a lot on ye and Kids See 
Ghosts feels planned. This is West’s new project: he 
wants to strike by ambush, creating work before he 
even knows what he wants to say. It’s not that the 
music is vacuous, but rather that West has chosen 
a different route to reach his insights. He wants to 
stumble upon them, surprising himself as much as 
us, and he trusts that his instincts will lead him to 
something worthwhile.
In and of itself, instinctual randomness does not 
make for a great album—the work must still be more 
than the sum of its parts. Thrillingly, improbably, ye 
and Kids See Ghosts add up to something profound. 
West makes us feel the pit at the center of being 
human, the deep chasm where loss, sorrow, desper-
ation, and the knowledge of mortality reside. He 
never directly references the pit, but instead evokes 
everything that surrounds it, all the bluster, numb-
ness, and giddy energy that are on the periphery of 
that terrible center. West shows us the shadows, not 
the thing itself. He doesn’t have to: we can feel how 
close it is. He is able to do this because he pos-
sesses the inexplicable instincts of a great poet, the 
ability to pluck the right phrase or sound as if from 
thin air. Take, for example, the most memorable line 
on ye, which is delivered by guest artist 070 Shake. 
Near the end of “Ghost Town,” she howls: “I put my 
hand on a stove to see if I still bleed.” In an inter-
view upon the album’s release, Shake told a revealing 
story about the line’s creation: “it’s funny because 
my actual lyric was, ‘To see if I still feel.’ And then 
Ye [West] was like, ‘I want you to say bleed.’” West 
does not need to explain his revision—when you hear 
Shake deliver the line, the words are simply right.
Kanye West has placed those who admire his work in 
a confounding predicament. His public persona over 
the past six months has been immoral. The content 
of ye and Kids See Ghosts, while far more nuanced 
than West’s public statements, is not unimpeachably 
ethical: both albums feature sexist lyrics as well as 
moments in which West defends or minimizes his 
recent behavior. And yet I think these albums are 
extraordinary. What happens now?
***
The cleanest answer is obvious: boycott Kanye West. 
For some, the impulse to do so is rooted in a visceral 
reaction—the same hurt that Lathan described, 
mixed with sheer disgust. This is understandable. 
But others, either implicitly or explicitly, use logical 
arguments to justify a boycott. The most sophisti-
cated of these rationalizations is what we could call 
the argument from economic dissent, and it takes 
the following form. It is a shame, the boycotter says, 
to abandon the music of Kanye West. But we cannot 
stand idly by as a powerful public figure advances 
ideas that sanction the oppression of our fellow cit-
izens. We must make it known that these ideas are 
unacceptable. And for the vast majority of us, the 
only communication we have with West is through 
the music he sells. Unfortunate as it is, we must 
therefore show our disapproval by refusing to buy.
This is a powerful argument. It is true that the most 
efficacious way to voice displeasure with West is to 
stop buying and streaming his albums. The alter-
natives—an angry Facebook post, a sharply worded 
letter, a comment amongst friends—seem patheti-
cally ineffectual. And we should certainly want to 
send a message to West that his support of rac-
ist rhetoric and policies is unacceptable. West’s 
platform is huge: more than 29 million followers on 
Twitter alone. His actions, in combination with his 
power, demand pushback. And yet I think that this 
argument for a boycott should not be accepted, for 
it fails to recognize (or else gravely underestimates) 
the damaging precedent that a boycott would set. 
To grasp this danger, we must understand the prem-
ises on which the argument from economic dissent 
rests. By arguing that we should abandon West’s 
music to show dissent for his public statements, the 
boycotter fuses (however reluctantly) the man with 
the music, the artist with the art. Listening to West’s 
music, per this logic, is an endorsement of his brand, 
and thereby of him in his entirety: music, public 
statements, private behavior, all of it. The prob-
lem with this is that it treats artists like politicians, 
viewing each as an inseparable entity deserving of 
either support or opposition. We hold—or at least 
should hold—our politicians to specific standards. 
They ought to check their facts, avoid contradicting 
themselves, and be wary of the repercussions of 
their public statements and actions. We look to them 
for moral public positions. If they do not meet these 
standards, they do not deserve our support. And 
because our option is binary (vote for or against), a 
politician who does not deserve our support nec-
essarily deserves our opposition. But to approach 
artists in the same way is an error. If we treat artists 
like politicians, then we will come to believe that 
our perspective on them should hinge on their con-
sistency and their morality, that we should give a 
thumbs up to the artist who voices good politics on a 
late-night talk show and a thumbs down to the artist 
who says something morally “problematic” (to use 
that vaguest and cheapest of contemporary criti-
cal terms). We will listen to the albums of the artist 
whom we endorse as a person and disregard the 
albums of the artist whom we condemn as a person. 
This will happen quite irrespective of other factors 
that determine the quality of artistic work, like tech-
nique, emotional impact, or insight.
Whence do we get the notion that listening to an 
28 29
album is the same as endorsing all aspects of the 
artist, equivalent to voting for a candidate? The root 
of the idea is simple: in America, we vote with our 
wallets. When we choose to buy a certain product 
rather than its competition, we say yea to the former 
and nay to the latter. Then the companies making 
those products look at how much they sold and 
decide how they should change to get more pur-
chases—more ‘votes,’ in other words. Buying music, 
the reasoning goes, is no different; when we listen 
to an album on Spotify, we tell the maker of the 
album that we support him, and that he should keep 
doing what he has been doing to earn our continued 
patronage. So listening to West’s music does not 
merely convey curiosity about the work of an artist—
it gives a vote to the man and all he says and does.
When this argument is applied to strictly commer-
cial products, it is logical and productive. Papa John’s 
and Pizza Hut both mass produce pizza, but only 
the former has an ex-CEO who was caught making 
racist comments. If I were a regular customer of 
Papa John’s, it would make sense for me to trans-
fer my business to Pizza Hut. It’s just a substitution 
of one second-rate pizza for another; why not use 
my dollars to make a statement? But applying the 
argument to art is different. Unlike Papa John’s pizza, 
whose sole purpose is to create a product that will 
attract buyers, art (when it is good) is made for rea-
sons other than pulling in the maximum number of 
customers. To use the logic of commercial mass-pro-
duction for art is an embrace of capitalism in its 
crassest form—which is why it is disappointing to 
see so much of the left adopt this argument. 
It is not entirely our fault: we have been raised on 
Marvel Studios and Taylor Swift, Fast and Furious 
and Ed Sheeran. Like most Americans, I enjoy some 
of these products and don’t enjoy others. But they 
are all just that: products, like Papa John’s and Pizza 
Hut. Encouraged by movie studios and record com-
panies, Americans have become accustomed to the 
idea that works of art are merely another type of 
product that we buy at the mall. Browse well, then 
pick your favorite brand. But serious artists are not 
brands. They do not offer us near-identical products 
at comparable costs. Each piece of art is a singular-
ity: just because two artists make work in the same 
medium and genre, we cannot conclude that they 
are interchangeable, nor that we should vote for one 
at the expense of another.
To stop listening to West and compensate by dou-
bling my consumption of Jay-Z—or even to be more 
proactive and transfer my listening-dollars to an 
up-and-coming rapper with admirable politics—is to 
follow the pizza model. It implicitly posits that the 
primary purpose of West’s art was to fulfill a quota 
in my musical diet, to satisfy a craving that could 
just as well be sated elsewhere. Admittedly, West’s 
particular affinity for corporate branding makes my 
defense of art as a non-commercial enterprise look 
a little silly. This is a man who has his own multi-mil-
lion-dollar sneaker line and has mastered the game 
of promoting his persona as a brand; as Jay-Z might 
put it, West is not a businessman, he’s a business, 
man. Is it not naïve to say that his output should be 
exempted from the capitalist game? Perhaps—but 
West’s work is a risky and distinctive act of creative 
expression. For all the money and branding that 
surrounds it, the music is art. To say that such work 
is just another product would mean that talking 
seriously about art is utterly inane, like spending 
hours debating the merits of Papa John’s pizza. This 
is the consequence of the argument from economic 
dissent: it establishes a model whereby art is just 
one more thing coming off the endless corporate 
assembly line.
We are thus caught between a rock and a hard place: 
either keep listening and lose an opportunity to 
meaningfully dissent, or boycott and lose the right 
to take art seriously. Neither option is ideal, and yet 
we must choose—there is no middle ground. It is not 
desirable to give Kanye West a free pass for what he 
has said; it is immoral. But setting a precedent that 
denies the value of art, that treats it as just another 
product, strips society of an indispensable source 
of value. To protect this core, we must be willing to 
become morally flawed. An imperfect solution is the 
best one I can find and the only one I can accept: 
uneasy but unwavering, I will continue to listen.
There is a second rationale for boycotting West’s 
music: the argument from hindsight. This argument 
posits that West’s recent statements have tainted 
his past artistic output, or at least brought out its 
worst aspects. The components of West’s music that 
were always present—the misogyny, bullish narcis-
sism, and muddled racial politics—now no longer 
appear incidental. In light of his recent statements, 
they seem to be part of a consistent project run-
ning through West’s oeuvre, a project which led to 
Trumpism. Coates alluded to this argument in his 
piece on West, claiming that “one is forced to con-
clude that an ethos of ‘light-skinned girls and some 
Kelly Rowlands,’ of ‘mutts’ and ‘thirty white bitches,’ 
deserved more scrutiny.” Indeed, Coates wondered 
whether such elements of West’s music were in fact 
“evidence of an emerging theme.”2 If they were, then 
perhaps it is a legitimate act of artistic reinterpre-
tation to now abandon West’s music, both past and 
present; why give our time to a project that was inex-
orably bending to the right, to slavery-as-a-choice, to 
racism?
The argument from hindsight is powerful because it 
rests on musical interpretation rather than eco-
nomic justifications—it has no need of the pizza 
model. And yet it shares a central premise with the 
argument from economic dissent: that an artist’s 
work is one indivisible whole, and therefore can be 
treated as a coherent political project from begin-
ning to end. This is a tempting approach, allowing 
one to cherry-pick those pieces of an artist’s work 
that fall in line with his current statements. But it 
is simplistic: most worthwhile artists do not have a 
single argument running through their work. Instead, 
their oeuvres are rich with contradictions—and this 
is certainly the case with Kanye West. 
For while it is easy to pluck morsels of Trumpism 
from his lyrics, it is equally easy to find ideas that 
contradict West’s current statements. Take the lyric 
Coates referenced about “thirty white bitches.” The 
full lyric (from his 2010 song “So Appalled”) is “cham-
pagne wishes, thirty white bitches / I mean this shit 
is fucking ridiculous.” Is this a crass glorification 
of excess, a self-lacerating critique of the speak-
er’s crassness, or both? As is frequently the case in 
West’s music, it is hard to tell. Contradictions and 
the tensions they yield are precisely what makes 
West’s work remarkable; to gloss over them in search 
of a single political project would be a mistake. Nor 
is West unaware of his role as a curator of inconsis-
tencies. One of the most memorable lines from ye 
comes during “Violent Crimes,” when West inter-
rupts his own monologue about the misogyny that 
his daughter might face from violent men to take 
an unforgiving look in the mirror: “how you the devil 
rebukin’ the sin?”
There is something important at stake here: the 
question of who gets the final say in interpreting an 
artist’s work. West’s current statements do his music 
no favors. He is, intentionally or not, encouraging 
listeners to focus on the most immoral aspects of 
his art. But to follow his lead and thereby conclude 
that we were mistaken to hear anything other than 
racism, misogyny, and denial of history in his work 
necessarily posits that the artist is the best inter-
preter of his own work. This is not the case. It is per-
fectly possible for an artist to reach insights in his 
work that he did not intend, or else to retroactively 
misinterpret his own creation. So when I hear West 
claim that “we can talk about history, but not too 
long,” I see no need to revise my reading of “Blood 
on the Leaves” as a song that critiques historical 
forgetting. That interpretation did not rely on West’s 
affirmation—it relied only on the music. Denying the 
artist interpretive authority affirms the mysterious 
potential of art: that it can say something even its 
maker does not know.
The twin notions that an artist’s body of work is 
indivisible and that his interpretation is correct also 
produce a third justification for boycotting, one that 
is particularly pervasive and particularly flawed: the 
argument from purity. This argument posits that 
letting the words of Kanye West enter one’s head 
makes the listener less moral. The unethical compo-
nents of the music, in tandem with the recent state-
ments of its maker, corrupt the listener’s mind. This 
argument rests, like the argument from hindsight, on 
the notion that West’s entire body of work has a sin-
gle definition, one largely determined by his current 
statements. If we imbibe the music, we only internal-
ize the bad bits. The argument from purity thus falls 
on the same flaw as the argument from hindsight.
But it takes a further logical misstep: if we choose 
not to imbibe the music of artists like Kanye West, 
it suggests, then perhaps we can avoid immorality. 
Perhaps we can be pure. While this desire is under-
standable, it is impossible: part of being human is 
having immoral thoughts and figuring out what to do 
with them. One cannot succeed in ridding oneself of 
such thoughts by refusing to take in morally-ques-
tionable art. We should want to be good people—but 
that means doing the hard work of grappling with 
immoral thoughts, not refusing to engage with them. 
To mute morally questionable content is thus more 
about appearing moral than actually being moral. If 
we make our minds into sacred cities, guarded at all 
times to ensure that nothing other than agreeable 
and morally sound ideas (or ideas stated by agree-
able and morally scrupulous people) get in, we do 
so with little benefit and at great cost: we starve 
ourselves of ideas. 
Suppose that we accept my arguments against boy-
cotting West’s music. Now we must pose a slightly 
different question: is it okay to like that music? 
Those who would answer in the negative assert that 
West’s music has immoral components (even when 
considered separately from his public persona), so 
to like it is immoral. This fails to recognize that 
morality is not a binary, but a sliding scale. Some 
works of art (most of them boring) are scrupulous 
and pure in their morality. Some works are horrific 
and evil in their morality (or lack thereof). But the 
interesting work exists somewhere in the middle. So 
while it would indeed be immoral to feel fondness 
for The Birth of a Nation or Triumph of the Will, the 
morality of liking things that lie somewhere in the 
grey zone—that are immoral here and there, but not 
to their core––is far more complicated. 
Our assessment of these works must therefore 
incorporate the other scales in play—those mea-
suring technique, emotional impact, insight, and 
pleasure, to name a few. When a work ranks highly 
on all of these scales but has morally questionable 
moments, it is not wrong to like that work. Morality 
is one factor of many in the consideration of art. In 
the 1936 film Swing Time, for example, Fred Astaire 
performs a dance in blackface. The dance is not 
central to the plot, it is not a lengthy portion of the 
film—but it is there, and it is immoral. Does this 
mean that we must dislike the whole film, that we 
should not express fondness for any of its other 
aspects? Or what of The Beatles, who sang “I’d rather 
see you dead, little girl, than to be with another 
man”—is all of Rubber Soul now irredeemable? No: to 
introduce nuance into our reactions, to say that we 
admire a piece of art while recognizing its moments 
of failure, is an essential skill. It allows us to holisti-
cally appreciate works rather than being blinded by 
a single shortcoming. Kanye West’s music stretching 
all the way back to The College Dropout is not per-
fectly moral. It has moments of shortcoming, some 
of them disturbing; these are worth discussing. But I 
still love the music, and I still will return to it, again 
and again.
***
One question remains, the most important one of 
all: why is art worth it? It is easy to forget how to 
respond to this. Moment by moment, day by day, it 
seems like the world is falling apart. In compari-
son to such terrible threats, doesn’t the venerated 
space in which artists experiment out loud look 
less important? No thinking person can avoid this 
creeping doubt, nor the thought that follows: maybe 
there’s just no room in our world today for anything 
but politics, for the clean, sharp, stubborn lines of 
resistance. Why should we invest so much time and 
energy defending the reckless ambiguities of art? 
If there is a chance that listening to Kanye West 
makes one less moral, or makes the world less good, 
why is it worth the risk?
There is no one answer. Art gives us many things, 
and what it gives shifts depending on the needs 
of the society and the listener. Most obviously, it 
gives us insight: “Blood on the Leaves,” for exam-
ple, changed how I saw America. Equally evident is 
that art can offer pleasure, something that is often 
trivialized but is an essential part of a good life and 
a good society. As that most poetic of American 
socialist slogans asserts, we do not only need bread—
we need roses too. Recently I found myself listening 
to West’s song “Father Stretch My Hands, Pt. 1” in a 
nearly-deserted subway car while returning home 
late at night. When the beat dropped, it was so 
graceful, so decisive, so supple, that I let out a giddy 
laugh. I could not contain myself: the sheer plea-
sure that the music had brought me needed to be 
expressed. It was soul-enlivening.
And art also heals. Few would think of West’s music 
as soothing, and yet a strain of gentle humanism 
runs through his entire body of work. From “Family 
Business” (2004) to “Ultralight Beam” (2016) to “Cudi 
Montage” (2018), West has made songs that are 
hymns to community, prayers for deliverance, bene-
dictions for continued life. Like so much else in his 
music, the healing power of these songs stems from 
West’s mastery of contrast—frequently such songs 
are situated on albums directly before or after harsh, 
feverishly energetic tracks. This positioning accen-
tuates the music’s healing power, making it feel 
necessary and earned. West’s music offers not the 
cheap and short-lived salve of comfort, but the deep 
satisfaction of empathy. It does not solve our prob-
lems, but it reminds us that we are not alone, and 
that someday, somehow, salvation might be possible.
But art can also offer something else, something 
more mysterious. That mystery something is best 
defined by example. In June, someone published 
a short video on YouTube, an excerpt from the lis-
tening party that West held in Wyoming to release 
ye. The video, shakily filmed on a cell phone, drops 
the viewer in during “Ghost Town.” On the outskirts 
of the party, 070 Shake is dancing to the booming 
sound of her own outro: “and nothing hurts any-
more, I feel kind of freeeeee.” Shake is only 21 years 
old, and she still looks and carries herself like the 
kid from small-town New Jersey that she is. She is 
jubilant, and as the sound of the song rises she runs 
off into the wide-open Wyoming field behind her, 
carving out a wide arc, returning to the crowd’s edge, 
then veering off again. As she runs, she extends her 
arms like a child imitating an airplane. A bright light 
throws her into sharp relief, illuminating a young 
artist’s joy for all to see. “We’re still the kids we used 
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to beeeee.” Lil Yachty’s distinctive red braids bounce 
into the frame. The whole time, a stocky white man 
in a cowboy hat lurks in the background, not moving, 
flanked by an equally stationary dog. “I put my hand 
on a stooooove to see if I still bleeeeeed.”
It is an astonishing scene: strange, hilarious, inspir-
ing, disturbing, intensely moving. Every time I watch 
it, this little video embeds itself into my conscious-
ness like a seed and then grows rapidly, pushing 
outward until it is no longer a part of me but I am 
a part of it, and then it keeps expanding until it is 
not something but everything, the whole of what I 
see, feel, and know. In one little minute, it captures 
the mystery and sorrow and joy and tumult of being 
alive. That is what art can give.
Kanye West may not be your artist of choice. You 
may feel none of what I feel when you listen to his 
music. But whichever artist shapes your world and 
returns it to you as a gift, dynamic in its imperfec-
tion—do not trade that person’s contribution for a lit-
tle more dissent and a false assurance of purity. Art 
is not a product, nor a way to reaffirm the perfection 
of our morals. It is the record of our collective time 
here on earth. If we do not choose to value that, then 
we may one day turn around to see that we’re living 
in a society with no justification for art. Or, far more 
terrifyingly, we may not turn around at all.
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mer editor of the Yale Herald, and has published articles 
and poems there as well as in the YDN Magazine. She is 
also an editorial intern at Music & Literature magazine.
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